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I. INTRODUCTION TO WARRANTLESS URINE TESTING
An obviously intoxicated individual enters her vehicle and drives
away. Within a mile of her destination, a police officer stops her due to
a broken headlight. The officer notices her slurred speech and blood-
shot, watery eyes, and also detects the smell of alcohol coming from
the vehicle. The driver fails standardized field sobriety tests and pro-
vides a preliminary breath test that indicates an alcohol concentration
above the legal limit. She is arrested and brought to jail. The driver
provides a urine sample. This sample is later tested and confirms she
was driving while above the legal limit of intoxication. She is charged
with driving while under the influence.
Another police officer stops a vehicle for erratic driving. The officer
notices that the driver is grinding his teeth, profusely sweating, has
twitching of his face and hands, and is using odd speech patterns. The
driver fails standardized field sobriety tests, including one designed to
assess if a person is under the influence of a controlled substance. A
preliminary breath test indicates an alcohol concentration of 0.00%.
Believing the driver to be under the influence of a controlled sub-
stance, the officer arrests him. The driver provides a urine sample
that is later analyzed in a laboratory. Testing reveals the presence of a
controlled substance in the driver’s urine. The driver is subsequently
charged with driving while under the influence.1
These two illustrations are examples of common cases involving
driving while under the influence of either drugs or alcohol and pro-
1. These examples come from the author’s experience with such cases while working
at a county attorney’s office for several years.
862 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:860
vide insight into how such cases are initiated by police officers. As
seen in these examples, generally a police officer conducts a traffic
stop due to poor driving conduct or unlawful vehicle conditions.2 While
interacting with the driver, an officer will develop probable cause to
believe the individual is driving while under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.3 After arrest, the driver will be asked to undergo a chemical
test to detect the presence of alcohol or drugs, refusal of which is a
crime.4
Until recently, the Supreme Court of the United States had not
considered the constitutionality of warrantless chemical testing under
the Fourth Amendment. With these two cases, the Supreme Court has
only considered blood testing and breath testing under the emergency
exception to the warrant requirement or as a search incident to a valid
arrest.5 While other state courts have considered whether warrantless
urine testing is justified under these two doctrines,6 the Supreme
Court has not considered the constitutionality of warrantless urine
testing. As noted, although urine testing is not the only type of testing
conducted in chemical testing cases, this Comment focuses on the con-
stitutionality of warrantless urine testing.
First, this Comment will address the development of the law as it
applies to warrantless blood and breath testing.7 Then, this Comment
will analyze how the emergency exception applies to warrantless
urine testing but ultimately decides it should not fall under this doc-
trine.8 Next, this Comment will explore the search-incident-to-a-valid-
arrest doctrine.9 The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine is an underde-
2. See John B. Lyman, Goldilocks and the Fourth Amendment: Why the Supreme
Court of North Carolina Missed an Opportunity to Get Officer Mistakes of Law
“Just Right” in State v. Hein, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1012, 1014 (2014) (“[F]or traffic
stops, a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a traffic law has been violated suffices in
nearly all jurisdictions . . . .”).
3. See Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1852–53
(2004).
4. In many states, it is a crime to refuse to submit to a chemical test after a lawful
arrest for drunk or drugged driving. Blood, breath, and urine tests are the three
types of chemical tests employed by law enforcement officers to test for the pres-
ence of alcohol or drugs. See Megan Gordon, Blood and Breath Test—Constitu-
tionality of Warrantless Blood and Breath Tests Incident to DUI Arrest: Impact on
Drunk Driving in North Dakota, 92 N.D. L. REV. 197, 199 n.7 (2016). For a list of
states that required an individual to consent to either a blood test, breath test, or
urine test, see id. As discussed in the remainder of this Comment, warrantless
blood testing was found to be unconstitutional, in addition to urine testing in
some states.
5. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); Missouri v. McNeely, 596
U.S. 141 (2013).
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra section III.A.
9. See infra section III.B.
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veloped area in criminal law, with few courts applying the doctrine to
any of the three chemical tests. Even fewer courts have addressed how
it applies to urine testing.10 The Minnesota Supreme Court was the
first court to consider whether warrantless urine testing is justified as
a search incident to a valid arrest.11 Thus, section III.B analyzes the
Minnesota case, State v. Thompson.12 This Comment ultimately con-
cludes that warrantless urine testing should be upheld as a search
incident to a valid arrest.13
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AS IT APPLIES TO
CHEMICAL TESTING IN DRUNK AND
DRUGGED DRIVING CASES
Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, “The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated” un-
less a search warrant has been issued upon probable cause.14 There
are only certain exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches
and seizures. One such exception is for exigent circumstances.15
Courts have considered the exigent circumstances doctrine, also
known as the “emergency exception” or the “emergency doctrine,” in
various scopes.16 Some courts refer to the “exigent circumstances” ex-
ception as a general exception, which includes other warrant excep-
tions.17 Other courts, rather than including a variety of exceptions,
refer to the “emergency exception” only when there is an immediate
threat to a person or property.18 The Supreme Court has considered
the emergency exception doctrine in the latter, by viewing exigent cir-
cumstances as those where a police officer conducts a warrantless
10. See Order on Motion to Suppress, State v. Wilson, No. CR-2016-638, 2017 WL
2999582 (Me. Super. May 15, 2017); State v. Helm, 901 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 2017);
State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1338
(2017).
11. See infra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
12. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 224.
13. See infra sections III.B. and III.C.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2009) (finding that law enforce-
ment engaged in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect is an exigency sufficient to
justify a warrantless search); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (hold-
ing that a warrantless seizure of a person was justified in light of the circum-
stances during which the person was attempting to destroy hidden contraband);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509–10 (1978) (holding that law enforcement
may enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its origin without a
warrant).
16. John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and Fourth Amend-
ment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433, 441 (1999).
17. Id. at 441–42.
18. Id. at 443.
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search based on the reasonable belief that “there exists a serious po-
tential for the destruction of evidence of a crime should they take the
time to procure a warrant.”19
Another justified warrantless search is a search incident to a valid
arrest.20 This doctrine allows a police officer to conduct a warrantless
search of one who is under a valid custodial arrest.21 Pursuant to this
exception, an officer may conduct the warrantless search without
probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activ-
ity.22 The search may extend to a suspect’s person, as well as the area
within the suspect’s immediate control.23 This doctrine is not a new
justification for warrantless searches but rather, this doctrine has
been established for centuries.24
A. What Are Blood, Breath, and Urine Tests?
Before the types of tests can be discussed, it is important to have a
basic understanding of how alcohol and drugs are metabolized in the
body. When a person drinks an alcoholic beverage, the liver processes
most of the alcohol.25 Ethanol, the alcohol found in alcoholic bever-
ages, is absorbed into the bloodstream during the digestive process.26
A person’s alcohol level is thus measured by the weight of the alcohol
in a certain volume of blood.27
There are differences between the metabolization of alcohol and
drugs.28 For many drugs, there is a two-phase metabolization process
19. Id. at 444; see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1996) (holding that a
warrantless blood test was justified because the police officer had a reasonable
belief that the dissipation of alcohol in the body constituted the destruction of
evidence and the extra time it would have taken to procure a warrant would have
allowed for a greater destruction of evidence).
20. See Kartherine M. McCormack-Traugott, Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 80
GEO. L.J. 939, 981 (1992).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 982.
24. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174–75 (2016) (“Well before the
Nation’s founding, it was recognized that officers carrying out a lawful arrest had
the authority to make a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person.”).
25. Chad Haldeman-Englert & Wanda Taylor, Ethanol (Blood), U. ROCHESTER MED.
CTR.: HEALTH ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/con
tent.aspx?contenttypeid=167&contentid=ethanol_blood [https://perma.unl.edu/P
2GU-BGVV] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
26. Id.
27. Drunk Driving, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/
risky-driving/drunk-driving [https://perma.unl.edu/7EP7-T5B6].
28. For a more in-depth discussion of the difference between the metabolization of
alcohol and a controlled substance, see subsection III.A.2.
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during which drugs are broken-down.29 Generally, the liver is the
main site of drug metabolization.30 The rate of metabolization for
most drugs has a capacity limit.31 The rate changes depending on the
drug concentration and the fraction of the metabolizing enzyme sites
that are occupied.32 The drug metabolites are the by-products de-
tected in forensic toxicology reports.33
1. Description of Blood Draws
During a blood draw, a needle is used to obtain a blood sample
from a vein located in either the arm or hand.34 The sample is then
tested to determine grams of ethanol per deciliter.35 Science has de-
termined that 0.08 grams of ethanol per deciliter of blood equals a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent.36 Drug metabolites are
also detectable in a blood sample.37
2. Description of Breath Testing
When a person is consuming alcohol, some of the alcohol will also
pass from the individual’s blood to their breath.38 During the breath
test, the subject is required to take a deep breath and exhale into a
tube connected to a breathalyzer machine.39 The air passes into a
chamber where the breath is surveyed by a standardized amount of
29. Jennifer Le, Drug Metabolism, MERCK MANUAL, http://www.merckmanuals.com/
professional/clinical-pharmacology/pharmacokinetics/drug-metabolism [https://
perma.unl.edu/9V3A-W7B5] (last updated Nov. 2017).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. An example is useful to describe the metabolization rate.
[I]f 500 mg is present in the body at time zero, after metabolism, 250 mg
may be present at 1 h[our] and 125 mg at 2 h[our] (illustrating a half-life
of 1 h[our]). However, when most of the enzyme sites are occupied, me-
tabolism occurs at its maximal rate and does not change in proportion to
drug concentration; instead, a fixed amount of drug is metabolized per
unit time (zero-order kinetics). In this case, if 500 mg is present in the
body at time zero, after metabolism, 450 mg may be present at 1 h[our]
and 400 mg at 2 h[our] (illustrating a maximal clearance of 50 mg/h and
no specific half-life). As drug concentration increases, metabolism shifts
from first-order to zero-order kinetics.
Id.
33. Toxicology Tests & Reports, DRUGS.COM (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.drugs.com/
article/toxicology-tests.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6YAR-952S].
34. Haldeman-Englert & Taylor, supra note 25.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Toxicology Tests & Reports, supra note 33.
38. Adey Hill, How Does a Breathalyzer Work?, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/quora/2016/10/13/how-does-a-breathalyzer-test-work/#2fcd77bf
1558 [https://perma.unl.edu/EQ46-5ZMN].
39. Id.
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infrared radiation.40 The radiation is absorbed by the ethanol and the
machine detects the amount that has been absorbed.41 Blood alcohol
content of 0.08 percent is equal to 35 micrograms of ethanol per 100
ml of breath.42 A breath test is unable to detect the presence of a con-
trolled substance in a person’s body.43
3. Description of Urine Testing
After being consumed, alcohol will also dissipate through a per-
son’s urine.44 Drug metabolites will also be passed into a person’s
urine.45 Once collected, a urine sample is sent to a toxicology labora-
tory, where tests will screen for drug metabolites and ethanol.46 Such
tests may include immunoassay, gas chromatography, or gas chroma-
tography/mass spectrometry.47 An immunoassay is used to initially
detect broad drugs groups, like barbiturates or opiates.48 The more
specific gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test is then used as a
confirmatory test that will also identify the individual type and quan-
tity of the controlled substance.49 Direct injection gas chromatography
is used to detect the presence of alcohol.50
Determining blood alcohol concentration from a urine sample re-
quires a conversion factor.51 This factor is often cited as between 1.3
and 1.33.52 The correct conversion factor is disputed in the scientific
community.53 However, in various studies, the urine/blood alcohol
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Alia Hoyt, A Breathalyzer for Drugs? We’re Not There Yet, HOWSTUFFWORKS
(July 7, 2017), https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/automotive/breatha
lyzer-drugs-not-there-yet.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/SMY7-3R5Z]. A study in
Sweden attempted to use breath testing to identify controlled substances. Id. Al-
though controlled substances were detected, the breath tests could not indicate
when the person had last taken the drug, which is an issue in drunk driving
cases. Id. But “developing an effective drug breathalyzer isn’t as simple as tweak-
ing the existing alcohol-detecting models.” Id. This is due to the difference in
metabolization and the vapor pressure of the substance. Id. Currently no such
breathalyzer has passed federal and state regulations. See id.
44. Ethanol, AM. ASS’N FOR CLINICAL CHEMISTRY, https://labtestsonline.org/under
standing/analytes/ethanol/tab/sample/ [https://perma.unl.edu/JVD6-JKQB] (last
updated Sept. 30, 2014).
45. Le, supra note 29.
46. Toxicology Tests & Reports, supra note 33. As part of the forensic toxicology test-
ing, there is often an internal review process to ensure the accuracy of the re-
sults. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 22.03 (5th ed. 2017).
52. Id.
53. Id.
2019] WARRANTLESS URINE TESTING 867
concentration ratio was cited as being between 2 and 0.8.54 Another
source of potential error is in urinary bladder accumulation.55 The
longer the urine is accumulated in a bladder, the greater the risk of
error.56 One possible solution to this potential error is to collect two
urine samples.57 In doing so, the first sample is to be discarded while
the second is analyzed.58 As with blood testing, the presence of 80 mi-
crograms per deciliter of urine is equal to a blood alcohol concentra-
tion level of 0.08 percent.59
B. Evolution of the Warrant Requirement for Blood and
Breath Testing in Criminal Cases
The Supreme Court has only considered the constitutionality of
blood and breath testing in drunk driving cases.60 The Supreme Court
has not considered urine testing in cases involving driving while
under the influence of a controlled substance or alcohol. In the context
of drunk driving cases, the Supreme Court has evolved from allowing
for the dissipation of alcohol to constitute a per se exigent circum-
stance justifying a warrantless search to only allowing warrantless
breath testing in the context of a search incident to a valid arrest.61
1. The Dissipation of Alcohol Does Not Constitute an Emergency
Exception to the Warrant Requirement
In 1966, in Schmerber v. California,62 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered for the first time the constitutionality of
warrantless blood testing and exceptions to the warrant requirement
in a drunk driving case.63 In Schmerber, the defendant was in an au-
tomobile accident and brought to a hospital where a blood sample was
drawn.64 A chemical analysis revealed that the defendant’s blood alco-
hol content was above the legal limit.65 The defendant appealed his
54. Id. For example, in one study, the actual blood alcohol concentration was 0.18%,
when the actual concentration amount was 0.11%. Id. (citation omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (describing that the second urine sample should be collected twenty to thirty
minutes after the first sample is collected); see also Ethanol, supra note 44
(describing the proper practice to better correlate blood alcohol concentration
levels and the amount of ethanol found in urine).
59. Id.
60. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); Missouri v. McNeely, 596
U.S. 141 (2013); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
61. Compare Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, with Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174.
62. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 758.
65. Id. at 759.
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subsequent conviction, arguing that the blood draw was an unconsti-
tutional search and seizure.66
In its analysis of Schmerber, the Court first determined that ad-
ministering blood tests constituted a search of the “person” under the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.67 To determine if the search
was unconstitutional, the Court considered if the officer was justified
based on the circumstances and whether the means and procedure
were reasonable.68 The Court found the facts supported a finding of
probable cause to arrest Schmerber.69 The Court further held the
search was constitutional, even though the officer did not obtain a
warrant.70 The Court recognized that the dissipation of alcohol in the
body was an exigency because the officer “might reasonably have be-
lieved he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay neces-
sary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the
destruction of evidence.’”71 Thus, the Supreme Court seemingly cre-
ated a per se exigency exception for drunk driving cases.72
Many years after Schmerber, the Supreme Court reconsidered the
emergency exception for the dissipation of alcohol.73 In Missouri v.
McNeely,74 the Court expressly held that the dissipation of alcohol in
an individual’s bloodstream does not constitute a per se emergency
exception to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures.75 The
defendant, McNeely, was arrested on suspicion of drunk driving and
taken to a hospital for a blood test.76 Officers took a sample of the
defendant’s blood without his consent.77 The defendant’s blood alcohol
concentration was above the legal limit and he was convicted of driv-
ing while intoxicated.78 The defendant challenged his conviction, ar-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 767.
68. Id. at 768.
69. Id. at 770.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Eagle, 498 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Schmerber as support for the argument that the dissipation of alcohol in a per-
son’s blood constitutes an emergency exception to the warrant requirement);
State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 2008) (relying on Schmerber when
determining that in certain criminal cases, the natural dissipation of alcohol “cre-
ates [a] single-factor exigent circumstance . . . that will justify the police taking a
warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw from a defendant”); State v. Entrekin, 47
P.3d 336, 348 (Haw. 2002) (quoting Schmerber to support that exigent circum-
stances were present because of the natural dissipation of alcohol that justifies
warrantless blood draws).
73. Missouri v. McNeely, 596 U.S. 141 (2013).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 145–46.
77. Id. at 146.
78. Id. at 146–47.
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guing that the blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights.79
The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately overturned McNeely’s convic-
tion by relying on Schmerber.80 The state court had found that Mc-
Neely’s arrest was a routine DWI case where no factors, other than
the natural dissipation of alcohol, suggested that it was an emergency
situation.81 Absent other circumstances, the court held, a nonconsen-
sual blood test violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.82
Missouri then appealed the case and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The McNeely Court first determined that a warrantless blood test
is a search of the person and is only constitutional if a recognized ex-
ception applies.83 The Court was specifically concerned with drawing
blood because of its intrusive nature.84 The Court ultimately deter-
mined that the dissipation of alcohol in a suspect’s body does not con-
stitute a per se exception to the warrant requirement.85 To reach this
conclusion, the Court reexamined its decision in Schmerber and the
totality of the case’s circumstances to determine if the law enforce-
ment officer faced an emergency.86 The McNeely Court clarified that
its holding in Schmerber was reasonable because the facts and circum-
stances in that particular case justified an emergency exception.87
The McNeely Court explicitly stated that it was not overturning
precedent.88
In McNeely, the Court acknowledged that the evidence—the per-
centage of alcohol in the blood—dissipates as the body eliminates alco-
hol from the system.89 But the McNeely Court declined to depart from
79. Id. at 148.
80. Id. at 147.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 148. For examples of constitutional warrantless searches, see Michigan v.
Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2009) (finding that law enforcement engaged in “hot
pursuit” of a fleeing suspect is an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless
search); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (holding that a warrant-
less seizure of a person was justified in light of the circumstances during which
the person was attempting to destroy hidden contraband); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509–10 (1978) (holding that law enforcement may enter a burning
building to put out a fire and investigate its origin without a warrant).
84. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148. Specifically, the Court was concerned because of “the
type of search at issue in this case, which involved a compelled physical intrusion
beneath McNeely’s skin and into his veins to obtain a sample of his blood for use
as evidence in a criminal investigation. Such an invasion of bodily integrity impli-
cates an individual’s ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’” Id.
(citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1973)).
85. Id. at 156.
86. Id. at 150.
87. Id. at 151.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)).
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a case-by-case assessment of exigency.90 Blood testing is different
than true “now or never” situations because the dissipation of blood
alcohol content is predictable and gradual.91 Furthermore, even where
law enforcement does not obtain a search warrant, there is a period of
delay prior to the blood test that will inevitably result in the destruc-
tion of evidence.92 Additionally, states have established different pro-
cedures to expedite the warrant application process, particularly in
cases involving routine drunk-driving investigations.93 Such expe-
dited processes mitigate the destruction of evidence.94 Thus, the Court
found that the dissipation of alcohol in the body may support a finding
of an exigency based on the specifics of the case, but it does not sup-
port a per se rule that the natural dissipation of alcohol will always
constitute an emergency exception to the warrant requirement.95
2. The Split Between Blood and Breath Testing as a Search
Incident to Arrest
Three years after McNeely, the Court decided Birchfield v. North
Dakota.96 Birchfield considered breath and blood alcohol testing in the
context of a search incident to a valid arrest.97 A search incident to a
valid arrest allows officers to search the arrestee or the area within
the control of the arrestee by virtue of a lawful arrest.98 Thus, a lawful
arrest justifies a full search of the person.99 The Supreme Court up-
held the modern form of this categorical rule in United States v.
90. Id. at 152.
91. Id. at 153.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 154.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 156. “In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can rea-
sonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without signifi-
cantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates
that they do so.” Id. at 152.
96. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016). Birchfield was the consolidation of three cases arising
from Minnesota’s and North Dakota’s implied consent laws. Id. at 2170–72. In
each of the cases the defendant was arrested for drunk driving. Id. Two of the
defendants refused to submit to a test. Id. One of the defendants was subse-
quently convicted of test refusal. Id. at 2171. The second defendant originally had
his charges dismissed in district court on the argument that warrantless breath
tests were not permitted under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court ultimately overruled the dismissal, holding that a warrant was not
needed under the doctrine that warrantless searches are valid incident to lawful
arrest. Id. The third defendant agreed to a blood test and objected to the results
under the argument that his consent was insufficiently voluntary. Id. at 2172. He
was subsequently convicted of a DWI. Id.
97. See generally id.
98. Id. at 2176–77 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973)).
99. Id. at 2176 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236).
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Robinson,100 which was reaffirmed in Riley v. California.101 In Riley,
the Supreme Court created a test to apply searches incident to arrest
in situations which could not have been envisioned when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.102 The Riley test considers both the degree
to which the search intrudes upon a person’s privacy and the degree it
promotes a legitimate governmental interest.103 The Birchfield Court
determined that although the Riley test involved cellphone searches,
the Riley test can be used to determine the constitutionality of war-
rantless breath and blood tests as searches incident to a valid
arrest.104
To reach this conclusion, the Birchfield Court first considered
breath tests in the context of intrusion into a person’s privacy.105 The
Court found that the air a human exhales is not part of the body.106
Thus in terms of physical intrusion, the search is insignificant because
the arrestee is merely requested to blow on the mouthpiece of the ma-
chine.107 The procedure is not painful in any way and is akin to using
a straw.108 In terms of privacy concerns, the Court found that because
breath tests only collect one piece of information—rather than a range
of personal information—there are limited concerns of privacy intru-
sion.109 Lastly, the Court considered the potential embarrassment to
the individual.110 The Birchfield Court determined that “once placed
100. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. For an in-depth examination of the modern search-
incident-to-a-valid-arrest doctrine, see Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 33
GEO L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 38, 60–61 (2004).
101. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014).
102. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176 (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85).
103. Id. (citing Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2177.
106. Id. (“Humans have never been known to assert a possessory interest in or any
emotional attachment to any of the air in their lungs. The air that humans exhale
is not part of their bodies. Exhalation is a natural process—indeed, one that is
necessary for life. Humans cannot hold their breath for more than a few minutes,
and all the air that is breathed into a breath analyzing machine, including deep
lung air, sooner or later would be exhaled even without the test.”).
107. Id. The Court considered the intrusiveness of breath testing in light of previous
holdings that the intrusion was negligible. Id. (citing Maryland v. King, 133 S.
Ct. 1958 (2013) (holding that a search involving the collection of DNA by rubbing
a swab on the inside of an individual’s cheek was a negligible intrusion); Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (holding that scraping underneath an individ-
ual’s fingernails constituted a limited intrusion of the person)).
108. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176.
109. Id. The Court contrasted the information collected by a breathalyzer with infor-
mation that can be obtained through the DNA swab collection as seen in King. Id.
In King, the Court found the DNA collected could provide information on a per-
son’s chromosomes and thus a person’s genes. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966–67.
110. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 625 (1989)). “The act of blowing into a straw is not inherently embarrassing,
nor are evidentiary breath tests administered . . . in private at a police station, in
a patrol car, or in a mobile testing facility, out of public view.” Id.
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under arrest, the individual’s expectation of privacy is necessarily
diminished.”111
In regards to blood tests, the Birchfield Court considered the hold-
ings of Skinner and McNeely.112 Blood draws are a compelled physical
intrusion into an individual’s skin and veins, and they extract a part
of the body.113 The Court acknowledged that while people voluntarily
submit to taking blood samples for medical purposes and blood draws
often involve little pain, it is a process few people enjoy.114 Addition-
ally, drawing blood samples raises privacy concerns beyond those pre-
sent with breath testing.115 Blood samples can be preserved and
information can be extracted beyond blood alcohol concentration.116
Finally, the Court considered the state and federal governments’
interest in preserving the safety of public roads.117 Drunk driving is
the leading cause of traffic injuries and fatalities.118 The Court recog-
nized that 9,967 fatalities occurred in 2014 due to drunk driving.119
For these reasons, the Court found that the searches further a legiti-
mate public interest of deterring drunk driving.120 The Court con-
cluded that because breath tests have a limited impact on privacy
interests and a legitimate government interest is furthered, breath
tests were held to constitute valid searches incident to a lawful ar-
rest.121 Blood tests, on the other hand, do not constitute a search inci-
dent to a valid arrest because these tests are invasive.122 The Court
noted that its holding on blood tests was made in light of the availabil-
ity of less-invasive breath tests.123
111. Id. (citing King, 133 S. Ct. at 1977).
112. Id. at 2178 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625; Missouri v. McNeely, 596 U.S. 141
(2013)).
113. Id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625; McNeely, 596 U.S. at 141).
114. Id. (citing McNeely, 596 U.S. at 141).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Traffic Safety Facts, 2014 Data, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY AD-
MIN. (May 2016), https://lplpllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Traffic-fact-
sheet.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/96CC-J4UQ]).
120. Id. at 2178–79.
121. Id. at 2184. The Court also made this determination on the fact that the effective-
ness of breath tests was not disputed. Id. It also acknowledged that a breath test
may be ineffective if an arrest attempts to prevent accurate readings by deliber-
ately not providing accurate samples. Id. at 2185. This concern was dismissed,
however, because such conduct qualifies as a test refusal under implied consent
statutes. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Birchfield Court acknowledged some of the benefits that blood testing has
over breath testing. Id. at 2184–85. For example, a blood test can be administered
to a person who is unconscious or unable to take a breath test due to intoxication
or injuries. Id. Another advantage is the ability for blood tests to be able to detect
other substances able to impair a driver. Id. at 2184. Both arguments were dis-
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3. The Oregon and Wisconsin Appellate Courts Have Held the
Natural Metabolization of a Controlled Substance
Justifies Warrantless Testing as an
Emergency Exception
The Supreme Court has never considered urine testing in the con-
text of any exceptions to the warrant requirement in criminal cases.
However, two states have considered whether the natural metaboliza-
tion of a controlled substance justifies a warrantless search of the per-
son.124 The Oregon Court of Appeals is the only state court to
explicitly rule that an emergency exception justifies a warrantless
urine search.125 On the other hand, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
considered whether a warrantless blood test is justified by the
metabolization of a controlled substance in the case County of Milwau-
kee v. Shah.126 Although this Comment analyzes the exigency doc-
trine in light of urine testing, the reasoning in Shah is still relevant to
this analysis.
missed because a law enforcement officer can still apply for a search warrant. Id.
Finally, blood can be withdrawn from an individual who is unwilling to consent to
the blood draw. Id. This too was dismissed because many states prefer not to use
blood tests for this purpose. Id.
124. Prior to McNeely, many state courts had considered whether the dissipation of
alcohol constituted an emergency exception and thus justifying warrantless
searches of the person. The distinction between pre- and post-McNeely decisions
is important because a majority of the courts made no distinction between the
dissipation of alcohol and controlled substance in the blood stream. See, e.g.,
State v. Steimel, 921 A.2d 378, 385 (N.H. 2007); Holloman v. State, 820 So. 2d 52,
55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Baldwin, 37 P.3d 1220, 1224–25 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001); State v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 885, 892–93 (S.D. 1999), overruled in
part by State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 245–46 (S.D. 2014); State v. Strong, 493
N.W.2d 834, 837 (Iowa 1992). These cases have either been expressly overruled
by the jurisdictions’ highest courts or implicitly as McNeely expressly declined to
create a per se exigency exception for the dissipation of alcohol. See Missouri v.
McNeely, 596 U.S. 141 (2013). Therefore, pre-McNeely cases finding that such an
emergency exception for the dissipation of a controlled substance are not consid-
ered in this Comment.
125. Few other jurisdictions have specifically considered the emergency exception doc-
trine in the context of urine testing and the metabolization of a controlled sub-
stance since McNeely. See, e.g., Byars v. State, 336 P.3d 939, 942 (Nev. 2014)
(“[T]he natural dissipation of marijuana in the blood stream does not constitute a
per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search.”). Other courts have
reviewed instances of defendants consuming controlled substances and then chal-
lenging the validity of a warrantless urine test. Although each defendant argued
the exigent circumstances doctrine, the courts in those cases did not explicitly
base their decision on the metabolization of a controlled substance. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Eubanks, 2017 IL App (1st) 142837, appeal pending (Sept. Term 2018);
State v. Wieboldt, 320 P.3d 597 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
126. Cty. of Milwaukee v. Shah, No. 2015AP1581, WL 2016 4275582 (Wis. Ct. App.
Aug. 16, 2016).
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The Oregon Court of Appeals first considered warrantless urine
tests in the case State v. McMullen.127 In McMullen, the defendant
submitted to a warrantless urine test.128 Toxicology reports indicated
the presence of several controlled substances, including cocaine, mor-
phine, and Oxycodone.129 The court held that the exigent circum-
stances—the metabolization of drugs—justified the warrantless
search.130 To reach this conclusion, the court found that the officer
had probable cause to believe the defendant had consumed a con-
trolled substance that could rapidly metabolize in a person’s body.131
The McMullen court also found it is unreasonable to require a police
officer to identify the exact substance that a defendant ingested.132
Thus, the court found “exigent circumstances exist as to justify ob-
taining a sample without a warrant.”133
After the McNeely Court’s ruling, the Oregon Court of Appeals
again considered the emergency exception in State v. Raymond.134 Al-
though the court never explicitly upheld the McMullen ruling in light
of the McNeely ruling, the court indicated its support of McMullen.135
Ultimately, the Raymond court remanded the case, stating that the
record was underdeveloped after the McNeely ruling.136
127. 279 P.3d 367 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
128. Id. at 368.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 370.
131. Id.
132. Id. (“Once police have probable cause to believe that evidence of a controlled sub-
stance will be in a suspect’s urine, the exact identity of the substance is of no
consequence in determining whether exigent circumstances exist. That is so be-
cause we cannot reasonably expect police officers, even drug recognition experts,
to be able to determine which controlled substance, alone or in combination, is
causing a person to act in such a way as to indicate intoxication.”).
133. Id.
134. 360 P.3d 734, 736 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
135. Id. at 740.
Here, as in . . . McMullen . . . there was probable cause to believe that a
“controlled substance other than alcohol would be present in defendant’s
urine,” and the state adduced proof that at least one controlled sub-
stance dissipates rapidly in urine after it is consumed. Specifically, in
this case, [the police officer] believed that defendant was under the influ-
ence of a central nervous system stimulant, and the record establishes
that cocaine, a central nervous system stimulant, has a “short detection
time” and may be “eliminated from the urine” within “several hours or
up to 12 hours” of consumption. That proof established the predicate
exigency.
Id. The Raymond court also indicated that it would not address the State’s second
contention that the warrantless urine test is justified as a search incident to a
valid arrest because of their “dispositive conclusion that exigent circumstances
justified the search . . . .” Id. at 738 n.6.
136. Id. at 742.
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The Wisconsin Court of Appeals had a similar analysis in County
of Milwaukee v. Shah.137 The court found that a controlled substance
constitutes an exigent circumstance due to the metabolization of the
drugs and the difficulty in detecting a controlled substance.138
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION AND A
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AS IT APPLIES
TO WARRANTLESS URINE TESTING
A. Analysis of Warrantless Urine Tests Under the
Emergency Exception Doctrine
There is a difference between the metabolization of alcohol and a
controlled substance. Regardless of the type of alcoholic drink that is
consumed, the human body metabolizes ethanol at a relatively steady
rate.139 The McNeely court noted that the percentage of alcohol in a
person’s blood will decrease at a rate between 0.015% and 0.02% per
hour.140 The exact metabolization rate will depend on individual char-
acteristics, such as weight and gender.141 Thus, any type of an alco-
holic drink will result in sobriety142 at roughly the same time.143
137. See generally Cty. of Milwaukee v. Shah, No. 2015AP1581, WL 2016 4275582
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2016). It is important to note that the Shah case is an
unpublished decision by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. The Shah case indicates
that the opinion will not be published according to Wisconsin law. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 809.23(1)(b)(4) (West 2017). Under this statute, opinions are not published
when “[t]he decision is by one court of appeals judge” rather than by a three-judge
panel. § 809.23(1)(b)(4). Any unpublished opinion is not considered binding prece-
dent or authority but may be cited for persuasive value. §§ 809.23(3)(a)–(b). Al-
though not binding in the state of Wisconsin, this case still presents an
interesting argument and perspective on how different courts are considering the
metabolization of controlled substances and the emergency exception to the war-
rant requirement. See Shah, 2016 WL 4275582, at *1.
138. Shah, 2016 WL 4275582, at *9. Even though “some controlled substances may be
detectible in a person’s blood long enough for a warrant to be obtained, there is no
way for an officer to know whether that time exists when making an arrest for
operating while under the influence of a controlled substance.” Id. The court also
based its decision on the fact that an officer cannot be certain when the drug was
consumed nor the dissipation rate of every type of controlled substance. Id. at
*9–10.
139. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 152 (2013) (citing Stripp Forensic and
Clinical Issues in Alcohol Analysis, in FORENSIC CHEMISTRY HANDBOOK 435,
437–41 (L. Kobilinsky ed., 2012)). For further discussion on the rate of the dis-
sipation of alcohol, see L. Anderson, Drug Testing FAQs, DRUGS.COM (May 1,
2017), https://www.drugs.com/article/drug-testing.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
2VTV-M4FV].
140. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152.
141. Id.
142. A person is determined to be sober when that person’s blood alcohol concentration
is at 0.00%. See Drunk Driving, supra note 27.
143. Although the type of alcohol that is consumed will not affect the sobriety rate, the
amount of that type of alcohol will. This distinction is important as a standard
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Alcohol’s relatively steady decrease in the body contrasts with the
variety of drug metabolization rates.144 For example, methampheta-
mine is often metabolized twice as fast as marijuana.145 Not only do
different drug families metabolize at different rates, but each con-
trolled substance within a family will also have different rates.146 For
instance, in the opiates family, morphine will metabolize about 1.5
times faster than methadone.147 Individual drug metabolization is
also affected by other factors, such as genetic factors, coexisting disor-
ders, and the interaction with other drugs present in a person’s sys-
tem.148 To further add to this concern, police officers do not know
which controlled substance a driver has consumed.149
Based on these facts alone, the metabolization of a controlled sub-
stance likely demands a per se exception. However, the Oregon and
Wisconsin courts failed to note an important difference between alco-
hol and drugs that explain why metabolization should not fall under
the emergency exception.150 Many drugs can be detected in a person’s
urine much longer than alcohol.151 Alcohol is generally detectible in a
person’s urine up to twelve hours after initial consumption.152 This is
significantly shorter than many drugs, such as methamphetamine,
which can be detected up to two days after consumption.153 Marijuana
has an even longer detection time—a single use can be detected up to
seven days after initial consumption while chronic use can be detected
in a person’s urine two months or longer.154
drink in the United States has about 14 grams of pure alcohol. How Long Do
Drugs Stay in Your System?, OAKS TREATMENT, http://theoakstreatment.com/
drug-addiction/long-drugs-stay-system/ [https://perma.unl.edu/A3N7-G6LK] (ci-
tation omitted) [hereinafter How Long?]. There are 14 grams of pure alcohol in 12
ounces of beer, 5 ounces of wine, or 1.5 ounces of 80-proof liquor. Id. Thus, drink-
ing 12 ounces of beer will dissipate and result in sobriety at roughly same amount
as 5 ounces of wine. See id. On the other hand, a person who drinks 36 ounces of
beer (or three beers) will take longer to reach sobriety than a person who drinks
only 5 ounces of wine (or one glass of wine). See id.
144. Compare id., with Anderson, supra note 139.
145. How Long?, supra note 143.
146. See generally id.
147. Id.
148. Le, supra note 29.
149. State v. McMullen, 279 P.3d 367, 370 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). Even if a driver informs
the officer of what drug he had consumed, this information may not be reliable.
See, e.g., United States v. Edmo, 140 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that the driver told officers he had ingested methamphetamine and cocaine, but a
urine test revealed the presence of marijuana).
150. See generally Cty. of Milwaukee v. Shah, No. 2015AP1581, 2016 WL 4275582
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2016); McMullen, 279 P.3d at 367.
151. See generally Anderson, supra note 139; How Long?, supra note 143.
152. Anderson, supra note 139.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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The longer detection period for a controlled substance fails to cre-
ate the “now or never” situation necessary to constitute a per se excep-
tion.155 As noted in McNeely, it will invariably take some time before a
urine sample can be obtained, regardless of whether a warrant is pro-
cured.156 Furthermore, although warrant procurement may take some
time, jurisdictions have stream-lined the process and reduced the
waiting period.157 Examples of potential ways to shorten the warrant
process include containing certain oath or affirmation wording in elec-
tronic warrant applications.158 Another option is to use an electronic
signature to satisfy the signature requirement of a warrant.159 With
such stream-lined warrant procedures, the concern that evidence will
be destroyed is lessened.
Moreover, a per se rule that allows warrantless urine testing to be
applied in certain situations and not in others may cause difficulties
in applying the exception. It is not uncommon for an individual to be
suspected of being under the influence of both a controlled substance
and alcohol.160 In such a case, the police officer would probably not
know if the emergency exception applies because the metabolization of
drugs constitutes an exigent circumstance but the metabolization of
alcohol does not. The officer would be faced with further questions if
the preliminary breath test indicates that the individual is under the
legal limit for intoxication. The officer’s determination may change if
the preliminary breath test indicates that the individual is over the
legal limit.
Additional questions and considerations may arise if the driver ad-
mits to consuming a large quantity of drugs but only a small number
of beers. This conclusion may also differ if the driver admits to con-
suming many beers but only taking a small quantity of drugs. The
officer may further wonder if the dissipation of alcohol is even a con-
cern if the driver has a controlled substance in her system. These
questions posed by the officer demonstrate the difficulty in applying a
per se emergency exception. Consequentially, the concerns that un-
derline the emergency exception are not present, and the difficulty in
155. Missouri v. McNeely, 596 U.S. 141, 153 (2013).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 154.
158. Andrew H. Bean, Swearing by New Technology: Strengthening the Fourth
Amendment by Utilizing Modern Warrant Technology While Satisfying the Oath
or Affirmation Clause, 2014 BYU. L. REV. 927, 944 (2014).
159. Id. at 947. For further examples on how to satisfy warrant requirements and thus
stream-line the warrant process, see id.
160. Gregory T. Seiders, Call in the Experts: The Drug Recognition Expert Protocol
and Its Role in Effectively Prosecuting Drugged Drivers, 26 WIDENER L.J. 229, 230
(2017) (citing DrugFacts: Drugged Driving, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (June
2016), http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/drugged-driving [https://
perma.unl.edu/D78H-WUWP]).
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applying the rule lends to the conclusion that warrantless urine test-
ing cannot be upheld under this doctrine.
B. State v. Thompson’s Application of the Birchfield Test to
Urine Testing and an Analysis of the Thompson
Holding
In Minnesota v. Thompson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was
the first court to consider the application of the Birchfield test to urine
testing.161 Since then, only Maine, South Dakota, North Dakota, and
Nebraska162 have considered if a urine test is a valid search incident
to arrest under the Birchfield test. Like Thompson, Maine, South Da-
kota, and North Dakota concluded that a warrantless urine test is not
a search incident to a valid arrest.163 Because the highest appellate
courts of these three states relied on Thompson in their analysis164
and mirrored the Thompson reasoning, this section focuses on the
Thompson case.
161. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1338
(2017). Interestingly, Thompson was decided less than four months after the Su-
preme Court issued its ruling in Birchfield. See id.; Birchfield v. North Dakota,
136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
162. As of January 1, 2019, only these four states considered this specific application.
This is not to say that other states have not applied the Birchfield ruling on
breath tests or blood tests. The lack of states who have analyzed urine testing
under Birchfield is not surprising considering that the Birchfield ruling has been
on the books for two and a half years. See State v. Wilson, No. CR-2016-638, 2017
WL 2999582 (Me. Super. May 15, 2017); Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2160.
163. See generally Wilson, 2017 WL 2999582, at *17 (“Based on its examination of
Birchfield, and the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Thompson, the
court is persuaded that if the United States Supreme Court and/or the Maine
Law Court were to directly address the issue, they would hold that the warrant-
less taking of a urine sample would not be permitted under the 4th Amendment
as a search incident to arrest, absent exigent circumstances or consent.”); State v.
Helm, 901 N.W.2d 57, 63 (N.D. 2017) (“Rather, on this record, we agree with the
rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Thompson and conclude that urine
tests under the Department’s form for submission of urine and the arresting of-
ficer’s protocol are like blood tests under Birchfield. We conclude a warrantless
urine test is not a reasonable search incident to a valid arrest of a suspected
impaired driver and the driver cannot be prosecuted for refusing to submit to an
unconstitutional warrantless urine test incident to arrest.”); State v. Hi Tar Lar,
908 N.W.2d 181, 187–88 (S.D. 2018) (“[L]aw enforcement must secure a warrant
prior to obtaining a urine sample from an arrestee . . . . Other courts have simi-
larly held.” (citing State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 244, 233 (Minn. 2016)). In
State v. Toland, the lower Nebraska court found that a warrantless urine test
falls under the search incident to arrest exception. No. A-17-1139, 2018 WL
4896908, at *2–3 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2018). The Nebraska Court of Appeals
ultimately did not determine whether urine testing is an exception to the warrant
requirement because the court found the urine test was admissible under the
good faith exception. Id. at *4. The court did not look to Thompson in making its
determination. See id.
164. Wilson, 2017 WL 2999582, at *12–19; Helm, 901 N.W.2d at 58–63.
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The facts of Thompson mirror other similar cases.165 Thompson
was initially stopped for poor driving conduct but, after he failed stan-
dardized field sobriety tests, he was arrested for driving while im-
paired.166 At the county jail, Thompson refused to submit to either a
blood or urine test.167 Under Minnesota’s implied consent laws, it is a
crime to refuse to submit to a chemical test for intoxication, which
included urine tests.168 He was subsequently convicted of a test
refusal.169
In its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Birch-
field test concerning whether a warrantless search is a search incident
to a valid arrest.170 First, the court found that there was a limited
physical intrusion in urine testing.171 Next, the court determined that
urine tests are comparable to blood tests and thus raise the same pri-
vacy concerns as those addressed in Birchfield.172 Finally, the court
found that “urine testing involves a much greater privacy invasion in
165. Compare Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 226, with Missouri v. McNeely, 596 U.S. 141,
145–46 (2013), and State v. McMullen, 279 P.3d 367, 368 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
166. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 226.
167. Id. at 227. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Birchfield holding as it
applies to blood testing and held that “[a] warrantless blood test may not be ad-
ministered as a search incident to a lawful arrest of a suspected drunk driver.”
Id. at 229.
168. Id. at 227; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (West 2016) (“It is a
crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person’s blood,
breath, or urine under section 169A.51 (chemical tests for intoxication), or
169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation of license) . . . .”). The most recent
version of the statute has been changed to reflect the court’s ruling in Thompson.
See Act of May 11, 2017, ch. 83, sec. 3, § 169A.03(2), 2017 Minn. Sess. Law Serv.
1, 5–6 (West). Now, a person can only be charged with a crime for refusing to
submit to a breath test or a chemical test “of a person’s blood or urine as required
by a search warrant . . . .” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (West 2018) (em-
phasis added).
169. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 227.
170. Id. at 229–30.
171. The court found that “urine tests do not implicate many of the physical intrusion
concerns the Court discusses in Birchfield’s analysis of blood tests.” Id. at 230.
This determination was based on the lack of intrusion under a person’s skin and
the fact that “urine is arguably ‘not part of [the human] bod[y],’ given that urina-
tion is a ‘natural process’ that would occur ‘sooner or later . . . even without the
test.’” Id. (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176–77 (2016)
(changes in original).
172. Id. at 231. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that a urine test reveals
personal information about an individual, such as disorders, pregnancy, diabetes,
or epilepsy. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617
(1989)). The court noted this was an important difference from breath tests,
which can only reveal an individual’s blood-alcohol concentration. Id. (citing
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177). Finally, the court cautioned that even if law en-
forcement officers are “prohibited from using the collected urine samples for pur-
poses other than alcohol concentration testing, ‘the potential [for abuse] remains
and [the test] may result in anxiety for the person tested.’” Id. (citing Birchfield,
136 S. Ct. at 2178).
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terms of embarrassment.”173 The court balanced these three factors
against the State’s need to conduct a urine test to prevent drunk driv-
ing.174 The need to conduct the test was then balanced against the
availability of less invasive, alternative testing.175 The Thompson
court acknowledged that the state has a “great need” for alcohol con-
centration testing.176 However, it ultimately determined that urine
testing was unreasonable because of the availability of other less inva-
sive tests.177 Because of the intrusion upon an individual’s privacy
and the availability of less invasive procedures, the Thompson court
held that warrantless urine testing is not justified as a search incident
to a valid arrest.178
1. Incorrect Application of the Reasonableness Standard
There were two major flaws in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in Thompson—the court incorrectly applied the reasonableness
standard to urine testing and improperly considered the embarrass-
ment prong.
The Thompson court stated that in Birchfield, the “government in-
terest in obtaining alcohol concentration readings through warrant-
less blood tests was diminished” due to the availability of less invasive
alternative tests.179 The Birchfield Court did not find that the reason-
ableness factor diminished the government’s interest in obtaining al-
cohol concentration readings.180 Rather, the Birchfield Court found
that this factor must generally weigh against the constitutionality of
the warrantless search.181
The Thompson court further stated that breath tests “will serve
the State’s interest in deterring drunk driving and preserving high-
173. Id. at 232. The court noted that the search involves “performing a personal and
private bodily function ‘in full view’ before law enforcement . . . .” Id. This was
contrasted to the fact that this bodily activity is often described by euphemisms
and traditionally performed away from public observation. Id. at 231 (quoting
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617). Finally, the court compared the extent to which blood
and breath testing causes embarrassment to the arrestee. Id. at 232. In compar-
ing these two tests to urine testing, the court noted neither search involved “per-
forming a private bodily function in front of law enforcement . . . .” Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 232–33. The Thompson court noted that warrantless breath testing, justi-
fied as a search incident to a valid arrest, serves the state’s interest in “deterring
drunk driving and preserving highway safety.” Id. The Thompson court relied on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield in reaching this conclusion. Id. (citing
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2184).
176. Id. at 233.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 232–33 (emphasis added) (citing Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184).
180. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184–85.
181. See id.
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way safety,”182 implying that the state has a diminished interest in
warrantless urine testing. This distinction is important because it in-
correctly skews the finding against the government when considering
the overall application of the balancing test. Thus, in light of Thomp-
son’s double application of the availability of breath testing and a find-
ing that the government’s interest is diminished because of the
existence of breath testing, the Minnesota court over-extends the rea-
sonableness application.
Furthermore, the Thompson court twice applied the availability of
a less invasive breath test against the government.183 Such an appli-
cation is incorrect under Birchfield.184 The Birchfield Court indicated
that the availability of the less invasive breath test creates a pre-
sumption against reasonableness that can be rebutted if there is a
“satisfactory justification” for the blood test.185 But once the unrea-
sonableness presumption was established, the Court did not then
weigh it against the government’s interest a second time.186 In
Thompson, however, the court found that the “availability of an alter-
native test [breath testing] impacts the reasonableness of urine tests
. . . .”187 The court held that breath tests “will serve the State’s inter-
est in deterring drunk driving and preserving highway safety.”188 The
court not only implied that the availability of breath testing dimin-
182. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 233.
183. See id. at 232–33.
184. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184.
185. See id. Although the Court did not expressly state a rebuttable presumption ex-
ists against unreasonableness, the entire reasoning indicates this is the natural
interpretation:
Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness
must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative
of a breath test. Respondents have offered no satisfactory justification
for demanding the more intrusive alternative without a warrant.
Neither respondents nor their amici dispute the effectiveness of breath
tests in measuring BAC . . . . One advantage of blood tests is their ability
to detect not just alcohol but also other substances that can impair a
driver’s ability to operate a car safely . . . . A blood test also requires less
driver participation than a breath test . . . . It is true that a blood test,
unlike a breath test, may be administered to a person who is uncon-
scious (perhaps as a result of a crash) or who is unable to do what is
needed to take a breath test due to profound intoxication or injuries. But
we have no reason to believe that such situations are common in drunk-
driving arrests, and when they arise, the police may apply for a warrant
if need be. A breath test may also be ineffective if an arrestee deliber-
ately attempts to prevent an accurate reading by failing to blow into the
tube for the requisite length of time or with the necessary force. But
courts have held that such conduct qualifies as a refusal to undergo test-
ing, . . . and it may be prosecuted as such.
Id. at 2184–85 (citations omitted).
186. See id.
187. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d at 233.
188. Id.
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ished the government’s interest in urine testing within the balance,
but it also held that the availability of breath testing weighed against
reasonableness in general. This second application unfairly weighs
breath testing against the government for a second time.
2. Incorrect Application of the Embarrassment Prong
The Thompson court also incorrectly considered the third privacy
prong, embarrassment, by failing to understand the urine collection
instruction and not considering pertinent Supreme Court precedent.
Thompson referenced Urine Collection Kit Instructions from the Min-
nesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension.189 The court stated that
“[w]hen an arrestee submits to a urine test on suspicion of drunk driv-
ing, the arrestee must urinate, on command, ‘in full view’ of the ar-
resting officer, who must witness the arrestee ‘void directly into the
bottle.’”190 The instructions do say that “[s]teps 1 through 7 must be
performed in full view of subject and witness.”191 This instruction ap-
plies to the police officer’s actions and not the arrestee’s action. Fur-
thermore, step two instructs the police officer to “[h]and bottle to
[arrestee] and instruct [arrestee] to void directly into the bottle and fill
to top.”192 It then instructs the officer to “[h]ave the [arrestee] hand
[the] filled urine bottle directly to [the officer].”193 The note to step two
instructs that the ‘[a]rresting officer or the witness must be present
when [arrestee] voids directly into bottle.”194
It is clear from this complete reading that the arrestee need not
urinate “in full view” of the arresting officer; rather, the arresting of-
ficer must only be “present” during the sample collection. This could
mean that the arresting officer only needs to be within an earshot of
the arrestee or that the officer be in the same room with the arrestee.
This does not necessarily mean that the officer must directly watch
the arrestee while he urinates. These examples present a much differ-
ent story than what the Thompson court presented; these examples
are less embarrassing for the arrestee.
A less embarrassing process is also important in light of three Su-
preme Court cases. The first case considers the procedure by which
189. Id. at 231–32 (citing BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION FORENSIC SCI. LAB,
URINE COLLECTION KIT INSTRUCTIONS FOR ARRESTING OFFICER (2011), https://dps
.mn.gov/divisions/bca/bca-divisions/forensic-science/Documents/Urine%20Speci
men%20Collection%20Instructions.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/XP2L-6M76]).
190. Id. (citing BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION FORENSIC SCI. LAB, supra note
189).
191. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION FORENSIC SCI. LAB, supra note 189.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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student athletes are urine tested for drugs.195 The following occurs
during the process:
[M]ale students produce samples at a urinal along a wall. They remain fully
clothed and are only observed from behind, if at all. Female students produce
samples in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside listening
only for sounds of tampering. These conditions are nearly identical to those
typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and especially
school children use daily. Under such conditions, the privacy interests com-
promised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in our view
negligible.196
This process is consistent with the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
instructions, which only require the presence of a police officer.197
The next two Supreme Court cases involve inmate privacy. The
Court has explicitly held that convicted inmates have a lower expecta-
tion of privacy than the general public.198 Likewise, those who are ar-
rested for a crime and will be brought to jail have a lower expectation
of privacy than the general public.199 Although these cases address
convicted inmates, their holdings are illustrative of how a balance can
be struck between privacy and state interests. In Bell v. Wolfish, the
Court considered the visual body-cavity inspections of convicted pris-
oners.200 The purpose of the inspections was to check for concealed
contraband, such as money, drugs, and weapons.201 Although the Bell
Court did not specifically consider the warrantless search under the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, it applied a balancing test similar
to the test in Birchfield.202 The Court indicated that it does “not un-
derestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the per-
195. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648–49 (1996).
196. Id. at 658.
197. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL APPREHENSION FORENSIC SCI. LAB, supra note 189.
198. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984). See generally Darlene C. Goring,
Fourth Amendment—Prison Cells, Is There a Right to Privacy, 75 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 609 (1984); Anne E. Craige, Prisoner Drug Testing Under the
Fourth Amendment, 27 B.C. L. Rev. 898 (1986).
199. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (“The search incident to arrest
exception rests not only on the heightened government interests at stake in a
volatile arrest situation, but also on an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon
being taken into police custody.”).
200. 441 U.S. 520, 528–30 (1979).
201. Id. at 558.
202. Id. at 559. The Bell Court determined,
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable
of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a
balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of
personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope
of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the jus-
tification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.
Id. at 559 (citations omitted). This test almost exactly mirrors the balancing test
applied in Birchfield. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2175–85
(2016).
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sonal privacy of inmates.”203 It also noted the possibility for a security
guard to conduct this search in an abusive manner.204 Despite these
concerns, the Court concluded that such visual body-cavity inspections
can be conducted on “less than probable cause.”205
The final Supreme Court case that should have been taken into
consideration is Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders.206 In Flo-
rence, inmates were subjected to a full-body search before being admit-
ted into a detention center and a correctional facility.207 The inmates
had to remove their clothing while an officer looked for markings,
wounds, and contraband.208 Officers looked at inmates’ various body
parts during the search, such as the ears, nose, mouth, arms, and
armpits.209
The petitioner also alleged that “he was required to lift his geni-
tals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the pro-
cess.”210 Because the case involved jail supervision, the jail’s policies
and procedures enjoyed deference unless “substantial evidence”
demonstrated the officers’ response to the situation was exagger-
ated.211 Although Florence applied a different standard, the case is
still instructive because the Court ultimately held that, even assum-
ing the facts in favor of the petitioner, the procedure “struck a reason-
able balance between inmate privacy” and the needs of the
correctional facility and detention center.212
C. Should the Urine Test Fall Under the Search-Incident-to-
a-Valid-Arrest Doctrine?: A Reconsideration of the
Birchfield Test in the Context of Urine Testing
This section will reexamine the Birchfield test in light of these new
considerations. Urine testing will be considered based on “the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.”213 The reasonableness of the intrusion will also be viewed “in
light of the availability of the less invasive alternative . . . .”214
203. Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
207. Id. at 324.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 328 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584–85 (1984)).
212. Id. at 339.
213. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016) (quoting Riley v. Califor-
nia, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)).
214. Id. at 2184.
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To assess an individual’s privacy interest in a warrantless urine
test, three factors must be considered: physical intrusion, the poten-
tial disclosure of personal information, and embarrassment.215 Urine
testing does not involve any sort of physical intrusion.216 The test does
not require a piercing of the skin or extraction of bodily fluid.217 Fur-
thermore, urination is a “natural process,” occurring “sooner or later
. . . even without the test.”218 Because of the lack of physical intrusion,
this factor does not raise any privacy concerns.
Urine testing, however, can reveal information about various medi-
cal conditions.219 For example, urine tests can reveal a wide range of
disorders, such as pregnancy, diabetes, or epilepsy.220 This, as noted
by the Birchfield Court, could “result in anxiety for the person tested”
and raise individual privacy concerns.221 The Supreme Court noted
that this anxiety may remain even if law enforcement agencies are
precluded from using a urine test for purposes other than blood alco-
hol concentration.222 This concern in Birchfield contrasts with Mary-
land v. King, where the Court held a warrantless DNA swab was
constitutional.223 In King, the Court considered the privacy interest
based on the possibility of revealing personal information outside of
its intended purpose.224 Despite these disclosure concerns, the Court
acknowledged that “a ‘statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwar-
ranted disclosures generally allays . . . privacy concerns.’”225 These
two contradictory holdings do not determine whether the capacity for
urine testing to reveal personal information raises privacy concerns.
Thus, this factor weighs neither for nor against urine testing falling
under the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.
Finally, urine tests may not be any more embarrassing than condi-
tions found in public bathrooms which have a “negligible” effect on
215. Id. at 2176–77.
216. State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Minn. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
1338 (2017).
217. Id.
218. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177.
219. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
220. Id.
221. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178.
222. Id.
223. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013).
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 155 (2011)). In Nelson, the Supreme
Court considered various forms used by NASA during their hiring process. Nel-
son, 562 U.S. at 139–40. These forms included questions about illegal drug use,
treatment or counseling received, and previous criminal history. Id. at 139–42.
Concerns were raised that this personal information could be disclosed in viola-
tion of the Privacy Act because such violations had been disclosed via data
breaches. Id. at 158. Despite these concerns, the Court ultimately held that the
forms did not violate an individual’s right to informational privacy. Id. at 159.
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privacy interests.226 It is important to compare the “public bathroom
procedure” to the arguably more embarrassing searches upheld by the
Supreme Court.227 The searches in Florence and Bell subjected naked
inmates to visual inspections by law enforcement.228 Urine testing, on
the other hand, would only require arrestees to urinate while an of-
ficer listened.229 The contrast between these two searches demon-
strates the relatively small compromise of privacy interests during a
urine test. A final consideration is the ability for states to set stricter
standards. If a state is concerned that the “public restroom procedure”
is still too embarrassing, each state can set stricter procedural stan-
dards. Because of the negligible embarrassment concerns, this factor
balances in favor of justifying warrantless urine testing as a search
incident to a valid arrest.
The privacy considerations must be weighed against the govern-
ment’s interest in obtaining urine samples.230 Both the states and fed-
eral governments “have a ‘paramount interest . . . in preserving the
safety of . . . public highways.’”231 As noted by the Birchfield Court,
alcohol consumption results in many traffic fatalities and injuries—
9,967 fatalities occurred in 2014 due to drunk driving.232 As with
drunk driving, reports indicate that a significant number of individu-
als drive while under the influence of a controlled substance.233 Ac-
cording to a survey by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, 293,000 people aged sixteen and older re-
ported driving under the influence of select illicit drugs in 2016.234 It
is difficult to accurately determine how many crashes are caused by
controlled substances for various reasons, including the fact that law
enforcement usually does not test for drugs if the driver has an illegal
226. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1996). See supra notes
195–197 and accompanying text for further discussion on appropriate procedures
that would lead to little embarrassment.
227. For the discussion of visual cavity and full body searches, see supra notes
198–212 and accompanying text.
228. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979).
229. See supra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
230. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016).
231. Id. at 2178 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
232. Id. (citing Traffic Safety Facts, 2014 Data, supra note 119).
233. CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND QUALITY, RESULTS FROM THE 2016
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES, tbl6.85C (Sept.
7, 2017), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2016/
NSDUH-DetTabs-2016.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/M2J2-VAVJ].
234. Id. “Selected illicit drugs included the use of marijuana, cocaine (including crack),
heroin, hallucinogens, inhalants, or methamphetamine.” Id. According to the Na-
tional Institute on Drug Abuse, “illicit” means the “use of illegal drugs, including
marijuana according to federal law, and misuse of prescription drugs.”
DrugFacts: Drugged Driving, supra note 160.
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blood alcohol content level.235 A 2009 study estimated that about
3,950 fatally injured drivers tested positive for a controlled sub-
stance.236 This represented 18% of all fatally injured drivers.237 From
the above facts, it is clear that the government has a “paramount in-
terest”238 in preserving the safety of public roads against both drunk
and drugged driving.
Finally, the reasonableness of the urine test must be weighed
against the availability of the less-invasive breath testing.239 One
such reasonableness consideration is the accuracy of urine testing.240
As noted above, there are concerns as to how accurate urine testing
can be for alcohol concentration determinations.241 There is not the
same concern for inaccuracy in drug testing because of the second con-
firmatory test.242
Second, as noted above, breath tests cannot detect the presence of
drugs.243 This is important because the other alternative to detecting
the presence of controlled substances is through blood draws.244 Law
enforcement still has the option to apply for a search warrant, as the
Supreme Court noted in Birchfield.245 This can be done if “there is
sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or from relying
on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
when there is not.”246 Although it is true that in most situations an
officer is likely to have sufficient time to obtain a search warrant, it is
unlikely that a police officer will be able to rely on the metabolization
of drugs to justify an exigent circumstance.247 Thus, if warrantless
urine testing is held to be unconstitutional, officers will always be re-
quired to secure a search warrant before an individual can be tested
for the presence of a controlled substance but will not be required to
235. DrugFacts: Drugged Driving, supra note 160.
236. Seiders, supra note 160 (citing Driving While Impaired—Alcohol and Drugs,
NAT’L COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG DEPENDENCE, INC., https://www.ncadd
.org/about-addiction/addiction-update/driving-while-impaired-alcohol-and-drugs
[https://perma.unl.edu/PK9J-23VQ]).
237. Id.
238. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (quoting Mackey v. Mon-
trym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979)).
239. Id. at 2184–85. The government’s interest should not be diminished because of
the availability of breath tests. See supra notes 179–188 and accompanying text.
240. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184–85.
241. See supra notes 51–59 and accompanying text.
242. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine Testing for
Evidence of Drug Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1166–69 (1990).
243. See supra note 43.
244. For a description of blood draws, see supra subsection II.A.1.
245. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184 (2016).
246. Id.
247. For an analysis that the metabolization of a controlled substance does not consti-
tute an exigent circumstance, see supra section III.A.
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secure a search warrant before an individual can be tested for the
presence of alcohol.
Finally, the Birchfield Court considered the level of participation
required to conduct the test.248 Urine testing requires the individual’s
participation because a urine sample cannot be extracted from one
who forcibly resists, is incapacitated, or is deliberately attempting to
prevent an accurate sample collection.249 Because urine testing re-
quires more invasive participation from the individual than breath
testing,250 this factor weighs against a finding of reasonableness in
light of available, less-invasive breath tests.
Thus, two factors—concerns for urine testing accuracy and the
greater level of participation involved in urine testing—may weigh
against urine testing being reasonable in light of available, less-inva-
sive breath tests. Nevertheless, when these two factors are weighed
against the inability of breath tests to detect controlled substances,
urine testing appears to be reasonable on balance.
Considering all of the above factors, privacy concerns do not out-
weigh the government’s paramount interest in preventing drunken
and drugged driving, thereby protecting our country’s roadways.
Thus, warrantless urine testing is justified as a search incident to a
valid arrest.
IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of warrantless urine testing has not been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court of the United States. Nevertheless,
some state courts have addressed warrantless urine testing under the
emergency exception.251 Courts in Wisconsin and Oregon have held
that a urine test falls under the emergency exception because of
the metabolization of a controlled substance.252 A closer examina-
tion of this exception, however, leads to a different conclusion.253
It is true that different drugs metabolize in the body at different
248. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184–85.
249. It is necessary to recognize that a urine sample can be forcibly obtained via
catherization. Use of a catheter would rise to the same level of physical intrusion
as a blood test. See State v. Hi Ta Lar, 908 N.W.2d 181, 186 n.3 (S.D. 2018). Due
to this level of physical intrusion, the use of a catheter to obtain a urine sample
should require a warrant but not the collection of a urine sample absent physical
intrusion.
250. See supra subsection II.A.3.
251. See supra section III.A.
252. See Cty. of Milwaukee v. Shah, No. 2015AP1581, 2016 WL 4275582 (Wis. Ct.
App. Aug. 16, 2016); State v. McMullen, 279 P.3d 367 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); see also
supra subsection II.A.3 (explaining why State v. Raymond, 360 P.3d 734 (Or. Ct.
App. 2015), implied that the Oregon Appellate Court was reaffirming its decision
in McMullen and how the analysis in Shah, 2016 WL 4275582 applies to urine
testing even though it concerned blood testing).
253. See supra section III.A.
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rates.254 However, drugs can be detected in a person’s urine for a con-
siderable length of time,255 and many jurisdictions have stream-lined
the warrant application process.256 These two factors negate the con-
cern that generally justifies an emergency exception—the time it
would take to procure a warrant results in the serious potential for the
destruction of evidence. Consequently, a warrantless urine test is not
justified under the emergency exception because the metabolization of
drugs does not constitute an exigent circumstance.
Only five state courts have considered warrantless urine tests as a
search incident to a valid arrest.257 The first was the Minnesota Su-
preme Court in State v. Thompson.258 The court erred in its reason-
ing.259 Because of these errors, the Minnesota Supreme Court
incorrectly concluded that a warrantless urine test is not a search inci-
dent to a valid arrest.
A warrantless urine test is a reasonable search incident to a valid
arrest.260 Although urine samples do have the capacity to reveal per-
sonal information, the Supreme Court has previously held that statu-
tory or regulatory duties prohibiting the disclosure of personal
information will alleviate privacy concerns.261 In addition, the embar-
rassment prong does not weigh towards excluding urine testing as a
search incident to arrest.262 There are testing procedures that only
produce a “negligible” compromise of privacy interests.263 Moreover,
the government has a paramount interest in prosecuting, preventing,
and protecting against drunken or drugged driving via urine test-
ing.264 The reasonableness of urine testing is not lessened by the
availability of breath tests.265 Rather, because urine tests can also de-
tect the presence and amount of a controlled substance in addition to
alcohol,266 urine testing is reasonable in light of the government’s par-
amount interests. Therefore, warrantless urine testing is justified as a
search incident to a valid arrest because the government’s reasonable
interests in conducting the test outweigh any compromise of the indi-
vidual’s privacy interests.
254. See notes 139–147 and accompanying text.
255. See How Long Do Drugs Stay in Your System?, supra note 143.
256. See supra notes 157–159 and accompanying text.
257. See supra section III.B.
258. 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1338 (2017).
259. See supra subsection III.B.2.
260. See supra section III.C.
261. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013).
262. See section III.C; see also supra notes 195–197, 226–229 and accompanying
text for further discussion on appropriate procedures that lead to little
embarrassment.
263. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1996).
264. See supra notes 230–238 and accompanying text.
265. See supra subsection III.B.1.
266. See supra section III.A.
